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Abstract
In their widely noticed study, Gergely, Bekkering, and Kira ´ly (2002) showed that 14-month-old infants imitated an unusual
action only if the model freely chose to perform this action and not if the choice of the action could be ascribed to external
constraints. They attributed this kind of selective imitation to the infants’ capacity of understanding the principle of rational
action. In the current paper, we present evidence that a simpler approach of perceptual distraction may be more
appropriate to explain their results. When we manipulated the saliency of context stimuli in the two original conditions, the
results were exactly opposite to what rational imitation predicts. Based on these findings, we reject the claim that the
notion of rational action plays a key role in selective imitation in 14-month-olds.
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Introduction
It is a demanding task for infants to filter relevant information
from the enormous amount of input they receive from their
environment. Nevertheless, one-year-old infants already selectively
use this information to guide their own action production. A
prominent example is the phenomenon of selective imitation. In a
widely recognized study, Gergely, Bekkering, and Kira ´ly [1]
adapted a paradigm introduced by Meltzoff [2] and showed that
14-month-olds imitated an unconventional action (i.e., illuminat-
ing a lamp by touching it with one’s head) if the model deliberately
chose this action as a means for goal achievement (i.e., when the
model’s hands were free). In contrast, the likelihood of imitation
was considerably reduced when external constraints in the model’s
situation justified her selection of the unconventional head action
(i.e., when the model’s hands were occupied).
The authors proposed an intriguing explanation for this
phenomenon, referring to a rational action account [3]: Infants
imitated selectively because they first evaluated the rationality of
the model’s action, taking into account her goal as well as the
means available to her to achieve it under the given situational
constraints, and then conducted the same means-ends analysis to
guide their own action (which was always performed under
unconstrained conditions). In more specific terms, this means
that infants presumably inferred that the model had good
reasons to freely choose to perform the unusual action in the
hands-free condition. As a result, the majority of infants imitated
the head touch. By contrast, in the hands-occupied condition,
infants did not imitate the head touch – presumably because they
understood that the model was forced to use the unusual means
(head) whereas they themselves were free to use the usual means
(hands).
This work is since regarded as evidence that infants draw
rational inferences which influence whether they imitate a model’s
behavior or not (e.g. [4–8]). In the current study, however, we
present evidence that such a complex explanation is not needed,
and we propose an alternative approach to account for selective
imitation in the presence of situational constraints. A closer look at
the paradigm used by Gergely and colleagues [1] reveals that the
hands-free and the hands-occupied condition not only differed
with respect to different situational constraints, but also with
respect to the saliency of context stimuli which went along with
these constraints.
In both conditions, the model put on a blanket before
illuminating the lamp. In the hands-free condition, she only
loosely put it over her shoulders. In the hands-occupied condition,
however, she pretended to be cold and wrapped herself in the
blanket, holding it together from underneath in front of her torso.
The blanket thus completely covered her upper body, forming an
eye-catching outfit. On top of the unusual head action performed
in both conditions, there was thus an additional unusual and
therefore salient feature in the hands-occupied condition. This
feature may, as a perceptual distractor, have competed with the
head action, drawing the infant’s attention away from it.
Accordingly, we propose a perceptual distraction approach to
account for infants’ selective imitation. While the importance of
directing the infant’s perception towards the model’s action is
widely acknowledged in imitation paradigms (e.g. [2]), systematic
research on the influence of perceptual processes on selective
imitation is lacking.
We tested the hypothesis of perceptual distraction from the head
action due to the presence of salient context stimuli in the
modeling phase by introducing two manipulations in addition to
the original conditions (see Figure 1). First, in a new version of the
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aimed to reduce perceptual distraction from the strange and
unexpected appearance of the model by familiarizing the infants
with the sight of this appearance during the 5-minute warm-up
phase which in all conditions preceded the imitation task. Second,
in a new version of the hands-free condition (hands-free distraction
condition), we aimed to enhance perceptual distraction by placing
red smileys on the table.
For these two additional conditions, opposing outcomes can be
hypothesized from the two alternative approaches, rational action
and perceptual distraction. According to the rational action
approach, infants will imitate the head action in the hands-
occupied familiarization condition as infrequently as in the
original hands-occupied condition. They should infer that the
model performed this unusual action due to situational constraints
(i.e., being wrapped in the blanket). If anything, the fact that the
model was already wrapped in the blanket and could not use her
hands during the warm-up phase should make these situational
constraints even more obvious. By contrast, according to the
perceptual distraction approach one would predict the opposite –
that infants will show more imitation of the head action in the
hands-occupied familiarization condition than in the original
hands-occupied condition. Once familiarized with the sight of the
covered model, they should be in a position to focus on the
unusual head action in a manner similar to in the hands-free
condition.
Following the same logic, the two approaches also lead to
opposite predictions in the hands-free distraction condition.
Rational action predicts that infants will imitate the head action
because the model’s action is not constrained in any obvious way.
By contrast, perceptual distraction predicts that the smileys are
salient context stimuli which will distract the infants from the
target action, leaving less capacity for encoding, and hence
imitating it. The likelihood of imitation will thus be reduced.
Methods
Participants
Fifty-eight 14-month-olds (M=13 months, 27 days; range 13.15
to 14.15) participated in the experiment. They were randomly
assigned to one of four experimental groups (hands-occupied:
n=14; hands-free: n=14; hands-occupied familiarization: n=15;
hands-free distraction: n=15). Ten additional infants were tested,
but had to be excluded from the final sample due to parental
interference, fussiness, procedural errors, or lack of interest. The
experimenter was a female adult. Infants were recruited from a
database of parents who had agreed to participate in infant studies.
Parents gave informed written consent prior to the experiment.
The study was approved by the local ethics committee of the
University of Leipzig, and conducted in accordance with the
Declaration of Helsinki.
Materials
A lamp (diameter 14 cm, height 6 cm) which was fixed on a
black panel and could be illuminated by touching, and a blue
blanket (1456190 cm) served as material. Additionally, in the
hands-free distraction condition, two black boxes (length 25 cm,
height 17.5 cm), each with a red smiley centrally attached, were
used. The infants’ and experimenter’s behavior were recorded by
two cameras.
Procedure and Design
The experimenter entered the test room together with the infant
and one parent. All conditions started with a 5-minute warm-up
phase during which the experimenter played with the infant using
a soft ball. The infant was then seated on the parent’s lap on one
side of a table, and the experimenter sat on the opposite side with
the lamp in front of her. Experimenter and infant continued
playing with the ball for a minute. In the following experimental
phase, the experimenter called the infant by his or her name and
said: ‘Look what I am doing!’ She then bent down, illuminated the
lamp for 2 seconds using her forehead and returned to the upright
position. This sequence was repeated three times. Subsequently,
the experimenter put the lamp in front of the infant, said: ‘Now
you can play with it!’ and left the room. The child was given
60 seconds to explore the lamp [9]. As in previous studies [1,2], an
action was coded as a head touch if the infant came within a
minimum distance of 10 cm of the lamp with his or her head.
Infants were randomly assigned to one of the following four
conditions (Figure 1).
Hands-occupied. At the beginning of the experimental
phase, the experimenter pretended to be cold and wrapped
herself in a blanket. Her hands were occupied holding this blanket
while she illuminated the lamp.
Hands-free. At the beginning of the experimental phase, the
experimenter put a blanket loosely around her shoulders. Her
hands were visible and free while she illuminated the lamp.
Hands-occupied familiarization. At the beginning of the
warm-up phase, the experimenter pretended to be cold and
wrapped herself in a blanket. From this moment on, her hands
were occupied holding the blanket. Like in the other conditions,
she played with the infant, but in this condition without using her
hands (first by kicking the ball and after they sat down at the table
by relying on the parent’s help). In the experimental phase, she
continued to hold the blanket. Her hands were thus occupied
while she illuminated the lamp.
Hands-free distraction. At the beginning of the
experimental phase, the experimenter put a blanket loosely
around her shoulders. She then put two smilies to her left and
right on the table. Her hands were free and visible while she
illuminated the lamp.
Figure 1. Experimental setup. The model before performing the head touch action in the hands-occupied and hands-occupied familiarization
condition (A), the hands-free condition (B), and the hands-free distraction condition (C).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032563.g001
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she had performed the head action and before she put the lamp in
front of the infant.
Results
All infants touched the lamp with their hands (for similar results
see [9,16]). Critically, however, only part of the infants imitated
the head touch. For the hands-occupied and the hands-free
conditions, we replicated the results obtained in the original study
[1]. Ten out of 14 infants (71.4%) imitated the head touch in the
hands-free condition, but only 4 out of 14 (28.6%) in the hands-
occupied condition, x
2(1,N=28)=5.14; p,.05.
More notably, the additional manipulations had significant
effects as well (see Figure 2): Although the model’s hands were
occupied in the hands-occupied familiarization condition, 11 out
of 15 infants (73.3%) imitated the head touch. The likelihood of
imitation was thus significantly higher than in the original hands-
occupied condition, x
2(1,N=29)=5.81; p,.05, and did not differ
from the original hands-free condition, x
2(1,N=29)=0.01, p=.91.
Furthermore, although the model’s hands were free in the
hands-free distraction condition, only 8 out of 15 infants (53.3%)
imitated the head touch. In the ranking of conditions, the
likelihood of imitation thus fell between the two original
conditions. The difference to the original hands-free condition,
however, failed to reach significance, x
2(1,N=29)=1.8; p=.18).
The difference to the original hands-occupied condition was not
significant either, x
2(1,N=29)=1.0; p=.32). However, if the
conditions were ranked in the following order, hands-free, hands-
free distraction, hands-occupied, there was a significant correlation
between the performance of the head touch (i.e., head touch or no
head touch) and condition: Across the three conditions, there was
a significant increase in the likelihood of imitation, d=.32; p,.05,
Somer’s d coefficient.
Discussion
In previous work, selective imitation in 14-month-olds has been
explained by the infants’ ability to apply the principle of rational
action [1]. However, the results of the present study suggest that a
simpler approach, based on perceptual distraction, can explain
these findings. The results show that the main factor that
modulates the likelihood of infants imitating an unusual action
was the presence or absence of a perceptual distractor. In the
original study, such a distractor was present in form of the blanket
which completely covered the model’s upper body in the hands-
Figure 2. Results. Percentage of infants performing a head touch in each of the four experimental conditions. The original conditions are
represented by the first (hands-free) and the third (hands-occupied) column.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032563.g002
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present study, the saliency of this distractor was reduced by
familiarizing infants with its presence (hands-occupied familiar-
ization condition) and the likelihood of imitation was now in the
same range as under unconstrained conditions (original hands-free
condition). However, when a distractor was present (original hand-
occupied condition and hands-free distraction condition), the
likelihood of imitation declined. Although the results in the hands-
free distraction condition were less clear-cut, the overall
comparison with the two original conditions and the results in
general show that the likelihood of imitating the unusual action
depends on the saliency of context stimuli in the modeling phase
and not on the feasibility of rational accounts of the model’s and
the infant’s own action.
Up to now, many studies have demonstrated that the
manipulation of saliency affects whether and what kind of
information infants perceive, and that selective perception in turn
influences action performance [10–14]. There is a gradual
increase in the amount of information that can be processed over
developmental age, but in six-month-olds, local stimulus enhance-
ment already improves performance [15]. It is thus not surprising
that a saliency manipulation during the modeling phase results in
selective imitation, even if the likelihood of imitation was
furthermore modulated by the presence or absence of situational
constraints. However, beyond demonstrating a strong role for
perceptual factors, our findings even seem to rule out a rational
imitation approach. As outlined in the introductory section,
rational imitation predicts the opposite of what we observed: In the
hands-occupied familiarization condition, infants experienced the
model’s external constraints much more clearly and explicitly than
in the original hands-occupied condition since, in the warm-up
phase, the model already did not use her hands to play after she
had wrapped herself in the blanket. The model’s situational
constraints were thus manifest for a longer period of time and
during a phase of direct interaction with the infant. Rational
imitation must therefore predict at least a similarly low, or an even
lower likelihood of imitation as observed in the original hands-
occupied condition. The present results indicate the opposite,
however: The likelihood of imitation was high, as predicted by
perceptual distraction.
Another alternative explanation for selective imitation in infants
has recently been proposed by Paulus, Hunnius, Vissers, and
Bekkering [16]. They refer to the approach of motor resonance
[17] and postulate that a match between the model’s and the
infants’ body posture is critical to activate the motor program of
the modeled action: When infants perform a head touch, they
always have their hands on the table to maintain a stable position.
In the study by Gergely et al. [1], the model took this position only
in the hands-free condition. Only in this condition there was thus a
match between body postures, and consequently, the likelihood of
imitation was high. The approach of motor resonance cannot,
however, explain imitation in our hands-occupied familiarization
condition because in this condition, there was no match between
the model’s and the infants’ body posture. Conversely, the
perceptual distraction approach is in accordance with the results
Paulus et al. [16] report for their test conditions: The likelihood of
imitation was low when the model held her hands up in the air
while performing the head touch (the infants were presumably
distracted by this unusual behavior) and when she was totally
wrapped in a blanket held by a button (strange appearance). The
likelihood of imitation was high when the model first played with
two soft balls and then kept one ball in each hand while
performing the head touch (infants could focus their attention on
the target action when the model stopped playing with the balls).
With some adaptations, the paradigm used by Gergely et al. [1]
has also been applied to demonstrate selective imitation in 12-
month-old infants [9], enculturated chimpanzees [18], and even in
domesticated dogs [19]. Whereas the authors of these studies
follow the theoretical framing of the original study and refer to the
rational action approach to explain their results, the selection of
participants suggests that a less-demanding perceptual interpreta-
tion might be more appropriate for these studies as well. Such an
alternative interpretation of rational imitation in domesticated
dogs has already been reported by Kaminski et al. [20]. In light of
the tendency to ascribe other sophisticated cognitive abilities to
infants of very young age (e.g., false belief understanding to one-
year-olds, see [21] for a review), we vote to acknowledge the
potential contribution of perceptual processes in tasks that are
designed to test higher cognitive abilities (see [22] for a similar
view).
To sum up, the present study demonstrates that the phenom-
enon of selective imitation in 14-month-olds does not require the
demanding rational action approach, but can be comprehensively
explained by a perceptual distraction approach. More important-
ly, our findings actually rule out the possibility that the rational
action approach can serve as an explanation for the observed
effects. In contrast to that approach, infants nonselectively imitate
new and unusual means for goal achievement – provided that
perceptual distraction by context stimuli present in the modeling
phase is controlled in a way that allows them to encode these
means. The rational action approach should thus be rethought in
debates on infant imitation.
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